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ACQUIRED INNOCENCE
The Law, the Charge, and K..’s Trial: Franz Kafka
and Franz Brentano
<This is a slightly revised English version of "Das Gesetz, die Anklage und K..s Prozess: Franz Kafka 
und Franz Brentano" in Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft 24 (1980) 333-356. The approxi-
mate pagination for the German publication is given in angle brackets within the text>
To judge simply from the vast and varied bulk of critical and inter-
pretative writings on Franz Kafka’s novel The Trial, few works of this 
century have been found as stimulating as this bizarre story of a fatally 
ordinary human being. The variety of interpretations placed upon the work 
is an amazing phenomenon in its own right. Indeed, the variety of divergent 
interpretations creates an impression that the interpretations often enough 
merely express the interpreters’ despair. It certainly tends to generate in 
some critics the conviction that Kafka’s works are not comprehensible at all, 
and it strengthens in others the conviction that effort at comprehension is 
altogether misplaced in the study of literary works. In the opinion of Erich 
Heller, for example, "[Kafka’s writings] defy all attempts at rational inter-
pretation"1 To Martin Walser, "It seems questionable--to judge by the multi-
tude of theological, sociological, psychological, as well as other com-
mentaries alien to poetry that Franz Kafka’s work has stimulated--whether 
he is a poet at all. The commentators, with Kafka’s friend Max Brod at the 
head of the pack, have called repeatedly upon Kafka’s letters and diaries to 
show his philosophical, theological…relevance." But, "The more perfect 
poetry is, the less it refers to the poet…"2 Working on a conviction that 
"[Kafka’s special sort of inspiration] was nothing other than the result of his 
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1"The World of Franz Kafka" in Kafka.  A Collection of Critical Essays, ed.  R.  Gray 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.  J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), p.  101.
2Martin Walser, Beschreibung einer Form. Versuch über Franz Kafka.  (Munich:  Carl 
Hauser, 1961), p.  11.
having cultivated an autonomous form-faculty…" 3 Walser proceeds to the 
sort of pure structural analysis which he considers the sole proper business 
of any <333> science of poetry. The analysis leads him to conclude that 
deliberate meaninglessness is the only inherent meaning to be found in Kaf-
ka’s works by those who are so misguided as to try comprehending them. 4
A reader turning for assistance to recognized experts in the science of 
literature opens a door into an appalling maze, more formidable even than 
Kafka’s works themselves: an experience which is at least potentially 
healthy, provided she is not simply seeking confirmation for a suspicion that 
in the interpretation of literature anything goes. Any such suspicion she 
might have, the reader will find expressly confirmed among those experts 
who see in Kafka’s works a perfect instance of their general thesis that the 
appropriate reaction to poetry does not depend on comprehending it. This 
thesis is advanced most explicitly by Dieter Hasselblatt, who 5 asserts, to 
elaborate on the intent with which it is advanced, that it is decisive not just 
for the fate of research on Kafka but for the future of the science of litera-
ture as well: "Perhaps such a thesis exempts itself apodictically…[This book] 
uses the traditional methods of scientific analysis both in order simulta-
neously to place them in question as well as to enervate them if possible." 
"The magic of mystery and the logic of evocative calling [beschwörenden 
Heissens] harmonize," writes Hasselblatt, "in poetic texts like Kafka’s during 
the playful duration of the text into a parabolical vacuum into whose 
suspensefully structured organization the reader is required to place her 
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3Ibid., p. 15.
4Ibid., p.  117.
5In his Zauber und Logik. Eine Kafka-Studie (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 1961), p.  29ff.
personal and private interpretation." But interpretation is not allowed in the 
science of literature which is permitted only to point out the organization 
and lawfulness of the text’s suspense-structure [Spannungsgefüge].6 Inter-
pretations, it seems are personal and private whereas structure is lawful, 
inherent in the text, and scientifically ascertainable. As object for a science 
poetry is said to have a certain inherent obscurity since it evokes "dimen-
sions" which cannot be grasped "rationally"; otherwise it would not be 
poetry at all. The science of literature must therefore reject the notion that 
the comprehension of poetry is its proper task. The alternative, says Hassel-
blatt, can only be that poetry will be regarded by the literary scientist as a 
bunch of “subtly concealed opinions of individual authors to be turned out 
by the science of literature. Poetry would be thus crucified on interpretable 
significance. A premise that must lead <334> to a depreciation of all poetry 
devoted to the experimental, the fragmentary, the obscure, the deliberately 
confused, mysterious, etc.,…"7 Thus, critics an"scientists of literature" who 
apparently deplore philosophical, theological, sociological, and 
psychoanalytical uses they see being made of Kafka by his many inter-
preters have come to use him instead for the purposes of meta-interpreta-
tion. Kafka’s works are regarded as an impenetrable shield behind which a 
certain interpretation of interpretation on the one hand and poetry in gen-
eral on the other can be advanced triumphantly. Yet such a meta-inter-
pretation is not eo ipso--because it fights in the name of "science"--
innocuous. If, as Susan Sontag asserts, “The work of Kafka…has been sub-
jected to a mass ravishment by no less than three armies of interpreters" 
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6Ibid., p. 140.
7Ibid., p.  30.
who read it as social or psychoanalytical or religious allegory,8 then the 
meta-interpretation proposed by Walser and Hasselblatt, if violent, is likely 
to be still more violent and to do more extensive damage.
At least within the community of intellectuals and scholars Kafka has 
become what an Hegelian might call a world-figure, and he has become one 
in the usual way for this community, posthumously. Whether by his own 
intention or by the cunning of reason, his works, the divergent interpreta-
tions they have occasioned, and the meta-interpretation of these have, as 
Heinz Politzer remarks, placed Kafka at the head of a movement:
Kafka has not just plundered [literary] scientific method of its 
unequivocalness; he has pushed into problematic twilight the 
interpretability of any poetry whatsoever. This problematicity of 
Kafka’s is what constitutes his importance, even for a sort of 
research that still considers itself to be scientific.9
Because of this development, any attempt to discover a perspective for fur-
ther and more powerful comprehension of the novel The Trial inevitably 
suggests that the figure armored in intentional obscurity who carries the 
standard against interpretation is in fact made of straw. The suggestion is 
confirmed to the extent the attempt succeeds. There is a perspective, as yet 
neglected for the most part, for approaching The Trial that does <335> 
indeed satisfy some of the requirements for sound interpretation. It involves 
a definite rather than a vague and confused set of concepts and problems. 
It can be strongly supported by purely textual evidence. It makes sense in 
terms of substantiated biographical data about Kafka without requiring that 
the novel be regarded as a mirror for Kafka’s personality. And finally its con-
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8Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York:  Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 
1966), p.  8.
9Editor’s foreword to Franz Kafka (Wege der Forschung, 322), Heinz Politzer, ed. 
(Darmstadt:  Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973), p.  ix.
ceptual framework is sufficiently pregnant to acknowledge the relevance of 
many, if not all, of the major interpretative approaches which have been 
attempted by others.
1. The charge against Joseph K. Ignorance of the natural sanction 
of law and custom.
One curious aspect of this intricate burrow of interpretative literature 
is the neglect of what Kafka refers to a"the Law." That any interpreter 
should totally neglect the notion of the Law is out of the question. The 
neglect consists rather in a chronic failure to take the term both literally 
and seriously. If the omission is corrected, the various episodes composing 
The Trial emerge as an illustration of some very complex and closely inter-
related problems in theory or philosophy of law. The nature of "the Law" is 
perhaps the most crucial enigma of The Trial. It must be shown, however, 
that what Kafka refers to a"the Law" is best approached from the point of 
view of jurisprudence. Lacking this perspective, attempts to interpret Kaf-
ka’s sense of "the Law" from ethical or from religious perspectives involve a 
falsification. They falsify not because they are irrelevant but because they 
distort by virtue of misplaced emphasis. The more appropriate perspective 
is that which sees in the enigma of the Law the issue concerning the 
obligatory character of laws. More broadly speaking, the issue involved con-
cerns the bindingness of any normative rules of conduct at all. Assuming 
such rules to resemble commands in some way, is obedience a require-
ment? To put it very briefly, the issue in question is the enduring core of 
the debate over the existence of natural laws as the basis for culturally 
formed rules. The latter, the behavioral norms that get accepted within cul-
tural groups, are often referred to a"positive law.  Positive laws may readily 
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be regarded as facts; the existence of some such laws is scarcely open to 
reasonable doubt. The existence of natural <336> law on the other hand is 
subject to perennial debate; while the "nature" of natural law--what sort of 
laws they would be if they existed--is debated with still greater heat among 
champions of their existence and validity. The sort of "natural" law theory 
Kafka is most likely to have had in mind must be weighed most carefully in 
any discussion of the role played by the Law in K.’s trial. The same will be 
true for any discussion of K.’s guilt or of the state of hi"conscience."
Textual evidence alone suggests very strongly that "the Law" if it is to 
be taken at all literally can scarcely refer to any system of positive law but 
must refer to a law of a quite different order. Moreover, Kafka--as is well 
known--studied law at the German university in Prague where he took his 
doctorate in June, 1908. In view of such considerations it is all the more 
remarkable that theory of law has received so little attention in literature on 
The Trial.10 Part of the reason for this neglect may be Max Brod’s assertion, 
“It was almost impossible to talk about anything abstract with Kafka. He 
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10Notable exceptions are to be found in Wilhelm Emrich’s Franz Kafka, A Critical 
Study of his Work, trns.  S.  Z.  Buehne (New York:  Frederick Ungar, 1968) and Joan Mel-
len’"Joseph K. and the Law" Texas Studies in Literature 12 (1970) 295-302.  Mellen seems 
unaware of Emrich’s work which had appeared in 1958.  She leaves quite vague the nature 
of the higher moral absolute to which Kafka "gives the status of natural law" (op.  cit., p. 
297).  Moreover, her thesis that part of Joseph K. feels guilty because it senses, divines or 
intuits that there is such a Law and that he is violating it contradicts Emrich’s correct 
insight that "Joseph K.’s guilt is his ignorance of the Law" (op.  cit., p.  316).  Emrich 
attributes to Kafka a conception of the natural law in question as a part of each per-
son’"inward" an"infallible" self, and he maintains that "the individual can lie…but not the 
natural law pervading him" (ibid., pp.  319, 325).  Thus Emrich attributes to Kafka an ethi-
cal theory of natural law which appears to be nativist in origin.  However, it remains 
unclear how such a view could be reconciled with Emrich’s own correct insight into the 
nature of K.’s guilt.  Moreover, Kafka was familiar with an ethical natural law theory which 
is profoundly anti-nativist and which admits the possibility of persons who have no concep-
tion whatsoever of good or evil.  Both these objections to Emrich’s otherwise excellent and 
penetrating exegesis will be elaborated in detail below.
thought in images, and he spoke in images."11 The remark carries consider-
able authority since Brod’s friendship with Kafka appears to have been close 
from 1904 until Kafka’s death in 1924. 12 The remark may easily be con-
strued as a sign that abstract, theoretical problems held no interest for 
Kafka. Moreover, it has been well established that Kafka’s study of law was, 
for the most part, repugnant to him. In all likelihood he would have <337> 
followed a quite different course of studies but for the influence of his 
father. All of which suggests that Kafka took little interest in law and still 
less interest in theory of law. For all that the suggestion is most likely false.
Klaus Wagenbach’s very thorough biographical study has documented 
an interest in philosophy beginning as early as Kafka’s fifteenth year when 
he appears to have read, or at least read about, Spinoza and to have advo-
cated a pantheistic view in conversations with a classmate, Hugo Berg-
mann.13 By the following year, Kafka had developed an interest in Dar-
winism and was reading Ernst Haeckel’s Die Welträtsel. He read Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra during the summer vacation before his last year at the German 
language gymnasium in Prague/Altstadt. Wagenbach refers to him as a fol-
lower of Nietzsche in writing of Kafka’s second year at the University of 
Prague.14 Assuming that Kafka did indeed take an active interest in at least 
some philosophical issues, his distaste for the study of law would indicate 
not that he was indifferent to theory of law but rather that the philosophy of 
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11Max Brod, Franz Kafka als wegweisende Gestalt (St.  Gallen, 1951), p.  36.
12Klaus Wagenbach, Franz Kafka eine Biographie seiner Jugend ,1883-1912 (Bern: 
Franke Verlag, 1958), pp.  102, 108.
13Ibid., p.  80.
14 Ibid., p.  102.
law most likely held more interest for him than other aspects of his legal 
studies.
a. Brentano’s conception of natural law
Wagenbach shows, in fact, that Kafka's concern for philosophical 
issues is most likely to have intensified during his years at the University of 
Prague. The development of this interest is particularly relevant since it pro-
vides important clues as to the issues in jurisprudence most likely to have 
drawn Kafka’s attention and the positions on these issues he is most likely 
to have been familiar with. Wagenbach emphasizes Kafka’s relationships to 
a group of very close followers of the philosopher Franz Brentano (1838-
1917). The group, which met in the Café Louvre, included both Oskar Kraus 
and Alfred Kastil, who would later become editors of Brentano’s works. 
Kraus and Kastil were then unpaid lecturers at the University of Prague. At 
the beginning of his second semester, Kafka enrolled in the course offered 
by Anton Marty, an older student of Brentano’s, of "Basic Issues of Descrip-
tive Psychology" together with some of his classmates from secondary 
school.15 Sometime thereafter, most likely during the same semester, 
<338> Kafka began participating in private colloquia held by Marty at his 
home and continued to do so for three years.16 He began attending the dis-
cussions in Café Louvre led by Kraus and Kastil at about the same time. Of 
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15According to Wagenbach, the group’s other members, all of whom became stu-
dents of philosophy, included Emil Utitz as well as Oskar Pollak and Hugo Bergmann.  That 
Utitz was studying law in Munich at this time and did not return to Prague until the sum-
mer semester of 1904 is established convincingly by Peter Neesen (Vom Louvrezirkel zum 
Prozess.   Göppingen:  Verlag Alfred Kümmerle, p.  20) on the basis of Utitz’ “Erinnerungen 
an Franz Brentano," Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 
Gesellschafts-und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe; 4 (1954/55), Heft 1, p.  73.
16 Ibid., pp.  107, 116f., 177, 243.
this "Louvre Circle" Emil Utiz has written, “We found ourselves involved in a 
wider circle of co-workers who often gathered in the evenings for endless 
discussions. Franz Brentano was, of course, not there. But his mighty 
shadow fell on all the talks, which were always a matter of interpreting his 
teachings correctly or of raising objections to them."17 Kafka continued to 
attend meetings of this group as late as December, 1905. 18
Ethics and philosophy of law were Oskar Kraus’ special interest, and 
there can be little doubt that the only work Brentano had then published in 
this field, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis,19 was often mentioned and 
often quoted. The book is a short one, but it has turned out to be one of the 
most influential works for modern theory of value. G. E. Moore wrote of it, 
“This is a far better discussion of the most fundamental principles of Ethics 
than any others with which I am acquainted." 20 The main text reproduces a 
lecture Brentano delivered in January, 1889 to the Vienna Society of Jurists. 
The lecture itself had been entitled "The Natural Sanction for Law and 
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17Emil Utitz,  “Errinerungen an Franz Brentano," Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der 
Martin-Luther- Universität Halle-Wittenberg IV (1954) Heft 1.   Quoted by Wagenbach, loc. 
cit.
18Neesen, loc.  cit., p.  29.
19First edition,, Leipzig:  Duncker & Humblot, 1889.  Fourth edition, edited with 
introduction, notes and index by Oskar Kraus (Hamburg:  Felix Meiner, 1955).  The work 
has appeared in two English translations first from the original edition under the title On 
the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, C.  Hague, tr.  (Westminster, 1902), the second titled 
The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, R. Chisholm and E. Schneewind, trn. 
(London:  Routledge & Kegan Paul) from the fourth edition by O.  Kraus.
20Quoted by Oskar Kraus in his "Introduction" to the fourth edition, op.  cit., p.  vii. 
{Subsequent note by the author of this essay: references (G. E. Moore, International Jour-
nal of Ethics XIV (1903) 123 and his Principia Ethica, Cambridge: The University Press, 
1903, pp x-xi) for this assertion by Kraus are supplied by the more recent of the English 
editions — The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong Oskar Kraus <ed>; Roderick 
M. Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schneewind <trans>; Roderick M. Chisholm <ed>; New 
York; London and Henley; Humanities Press; Routledge and Kegan Paul; 162 fn4.}
Custom." It was delivered in part in opposition to the positivist theory of 
law which had recently been advanced by Rudolph von Ihering and to a pro-
posed reform which would have eliminated the philosophy requirement from 
the law curriculum.
Ihering had advocated that the science of law become a purely 
empirical science. Such a science would be purely descriptive. It would be 
concerned exclusively with de facto laws and would describe them purely as 
facts. <339>The subject matter would be the actual prescriptive rules of 
actual societies. These rules, taken collectively, make up the body of fac-
tual, positive law. Positive law would include all rules enacted through a 
process of legislation. It would also include customary rules of behavior 
even if these were not formulated legislatively. The ultimate test for the 
presence of such a rule would be the administration of any sort of reward or 
punishment (“sanction"). Wherever a reward or punishment--no matter how 
trivial--is administered there is a prescriptive rule involved. Positive laws 
are therefore, all of them, empirically determinable. A positive science of 
law would include them all in its subject matter. It would exclude all so-
called natural laws or natural rights which might be proposed as tests for 
the validity of positive laws. Ihering goes on to deny that there are any nat-
ural laws which might serve as norms for positive laws. There are no uni-
versally valid principles by which the validity of positive laws could be 
established or disestablished. This being so, any question as to their validity 
or bindingness is a pseudo-question. This is the thesis which Brentano sets 
himself to refute.
To begin with, he distinguishes between several different senses of 
the word ‘natural’ in such phrases a"natural law" an"naturally right." On the 
one hand, “the natural" may be opposed to what is acquired through experi-
-10-
  
ence in historical development. In this sense, ‘natural’ may mean either 
innate or given by nature, i.e., derived from facts concerning what it means 
to be human. On the other hand, natural rules would be those which can be 
known to be correct and binding by their nature, i.e., in and for themselves. 
In this second sense, natural is the opposite not of "acquired" but of "con-
ventional" or "arbitrary." Natural rules would be those having an inner and 
knowable correctness (sanction) in contrast to those established simply by 
factual, positive decree. Ihering denies natural law in both senses. Brentano 
agrees completely so far as the first sense is concerned. He disagrees 
totally where the second is concerned.
Brentano’s rejection of authoritative decree as a valid and binding 
basis for obligation is particularly relevant to an understanding of the basic 
"error" in Joseph K.’s conduct in The Trial. Every command is subject to the 
question, “Is it a justified or an unjustified demand?"
And this question does not ask for another command, one that 
might be backed up by a still greater power. For then the ques-
tion would recur, and we should arrive from the first command 
at a command to obey the command and then at <340> a third 
command which would command obedience to the command to 
obey the command, and so forth toward infinity.21
 
“Is the demand justified?" asks not whether the demand is authoritative but 
whether it is just, whether what it commands is the sort of action which 
may be rightly commanded. In launching his lecture, Brentano had repeated 
an exclamation of Leibniz’, “If only those who study law would get over 
their contempt for philosophy and see that without philosophy most of the 
-11-
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21Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (Leipzig:  Duncker & Humblot, 
1889), pp.  9-10, §10).  In referring to this work, the first edition--the one available to 
Kafka--will be cited; section numbers will be given in parentheses to facilitate use of other 
editions, English and German.  Quotations will be my own translations from the first edi-
tion.
issues in their jurisprudence are a labyrinth with no exit." 22 Joseph K.’s 
search for an authority who might help him bring his case to a successful 
conclusion is a journey through just such a maze.
If the law by which his guilt or innocence might be determined were 
some code of positive law, then his hiring a competent lawyer would make 
sense; his efforts to engage the assistance of others directly and indirectly 
associated with the Court would be, in some sense, appropriate. There are 
after all authorities on codes of law, and courts are susceptible to influence. 
But here there are no clear criteria for competency of lawyers. And it is by 
no means clear how the various intrigues suggested to K. might influence a 
verdict. The painter and arch intriguer Titorelli has more to say about the 
administration of the Court than any other character in the novel. From him 
we learn that "dissent by individual judges can not affect the result" and 
that influence can achieve only "ostensible [scheinbare]" acquittal, which 
changes nothing since "the whole dossier continues to circulate, as the offi-
cial routine demands…"23 The successful use of influence to achieve 
ostensible acquittal changes only the subjective feelings of the accused--he 
"feels supremely confident" but is not genuinely freed. Moreover, if the Law 
were some positive code then the authority of the warders who arrest K. as 
agents of the Court we would expect to be of some importance. But they 
brush off his demand that they identify themselves. Even K.’s own identifi-
cation papers are irrelevant:
“What are your papers to us?" cried the tall warder. “You’re 
behaving worse than a child. What are you after? <341> Do you 
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22Ibid., p. (§1).
23Franz Kafka, The Trial, tr. Willa and Edwin Muir, revised, and with additional 
material tran slated by E. M. Butler, with excerpts from Kafka’s Diaries, drawings by Franz 
Kafka (“Definitive Edition”; New York: Schoken Books, 1968) 157 ff.
think you’ll bring this case of yours to a speedier end by wran-
gling with us, your warders, over papers and warrants?"24
The chapter describing K.’s arrest also contains what is perhaps the 
most important single clue to the nature of the Law. Warder Franz 
addresses Warder Willem:
“See, Willem, he admits that he doesn’t know the Law and yet 
he claims he’s innocent." “You’re quite right, but you’ll never 
make a man like that see reason," replied the other. K. gave no 
further answer; “must I," he thought, “let myself be confused 
still worse by the gabble of those wretched hirelings?"25 
K. can make no sense of Franz’ statement; and this is not surprising given 
his admission that he is not acquainted with the Law to which Willem has 
referred for the first time. For the Law in question can scarcely be a positive 
law or any code of positive law. Short of outright assertion, Franz’ observa-
tion suggests about as strongly as anything can that innocence of the Law is 
not compatible with innocence under the Law. Now ignorance of a particular 
positive law is notoriously consistent with guilt under that law. But the 
enactment of a positive law stipulating that ignorance of the enactment 
shall entail a violation of that law, while conceivable, would be pointless 
and even ridiculous under most circumstances. Normally, only those held 
responsible for administering and applying the enacted laws are charged 
with a duty to know them.
Franz’ remark about ignorance of the Law and innocence under it 
might at first seem to suggest irrationality on K.’s part without implying 
guilt. He is after all asserting innocence while admitting that, not knowing 
the law, he is in no position to decide his guilt or innocence. On this read-
-13-
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24Ibid., p. 9.
25Ibid.
ing, however, Willem’s reply would make no sense, for then getting K. to 
see reason would seemingly be no impossible task. One would need only to 
point out the law in question and show K. how his behavior had violated it. 
He might still claim that the law is without authority or that it is an absurd 
and irrational one, but he would presumably be able to tell whether he had 
in fact behaved in a way forbidden by the law. As it turns out K. is other-
wise a perfectly law-abiding citizen; he follows all the customary and legal 
rules. The very first sentence of the novel tells us he has done no harm 
[Böses].
Moreover, if the Law were one <342> that could be pointed out to K., 
it would have to be communicable--capable of being stated and so capable 
of being written down. If this cannot be done--if what is spoken of is the 
sort of intrinsically right natural rule Brentano has in mind as the foundation 
for law and custom, Willem’s reply is more than sensible. It shows what K.’s 
trial is all about. For there will be no way to get K. to "see reason" if he is 
not either already familiar with the Law (nativism) or capable of discovering 
it on his own. That he is not already familiar with it he states at the outset. 
The ensuing trial will test whether he is capable of discovering it on his 
own, whether he is capable of "coming up against it yet." 26
The Law K. is accused of violating requires that every member of the 
community of persons be acquainted with the law. K.’s identity is a matter 
of indifference, so is the identity of his accusers. To have no acquaintance 
with the Law is "crime" of a higher order, one for which he is in the end 
executed. Positive laws place no such requirement--not at least in the 
normal course of things. From the standpoint of an ethical--as opposed to 
-14-
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26ibid.
"naturalistic"--theory of natural law such as that of Brentano, acquaintance 
with the (moral) Law is morally necessary in a double sense. For, in the first 
place, such knowledge is good in itself so that a person who has knowledge 
of the good is a better person than she would be without it. And, secondly, 
acquaintance with the good has extrinsic value in that it provides--accord-
ing to such theories--the sole basis for insight into the person’s obligation to 
obey positive laws, for these derive their extrinsic and therefore conditional 
value from the manner in which they maintain social conditions necessary 
to prevent retrogress in and to promote progress in the actualization of 
goods and the elimination of evils. 
b. Natural law and human need in the Protagoras
This, in crude outline, is the concept that Brentano had advanced of 
the natural sanction for positive law. Kafka was also familiar 27 with one of 
the earliest natural law theories of an ethical, non-naturalistic sort, viz., the 
one attributed by Plato to his Protagoras. According to Protagoras’ version of 
the Prometheus myth, Prometheus’ well meant but culpable gift of fire and 
wisdom in the arts to humanity--that  had been left ill equipped <343>for 
survival by Epimetheus--proved inadequate. In order to survive, they 
needed civic wisdom as well since outside of social groups they could not 
compete successfully with other animals. They could form lasting social 
groups, however, because of the harm they did one another owing to their 
total lack of civic art and lack as well of all sense of right and respect 
<shame>. So, to preserve the race from destruction, Zeus sent Hermes to 
distribute right and respect among men and to distribute the"To all…let all 
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have their share; for cities can not be formed if only a few have a share of 
these as of the other arts." And Zeus added to this decree a law for all 
humanity, one that precedes all human conventions and is obviously of a 
quite different order than they, that "…<anyone> who cannot partake of 
respect and right shall die the death as a public pest."28 Joseph K.’s trial is a 
test of whether he experiences emotions of the sort that make it possible to 
know the good, i.e., whether he is capable of respect and right. K. is 
executed when the Court decides that the sentence prescribed by Zeus’ law 
is applicable in his case. The law in question is of a higher order in part 
because it is decreed by Zeus in his capacity as the keeper of civic wisdom. 
Protagoras tells us that Prometheus had not been able to steal civic art in 
order to give it to humanity because civic wisdom "…was in the possession 
of Zeus; Prometheus could not make so free as to enter the citadel which is 
the dwelling-place of Zeus, and moreover, the guards of Zeus were ter-
rible…"29 K.’s discussion with the Court chaplain of the parable "Before the 
Law" is generally acknowledged to be one of the most crucial passages in 
the novel. This evaluation is almost certainly correct. The discussion and 
the parable itself are among the most important keys to the enigma posed 
by the Law. But they are themselves among the most enigmatic passages in 
Kafka’s works. From the standpoint of the interpretation being attempted 
here, it seems most likely that Kafka had in mind the citadel of Zeus, 
according to Protagoras the residence and source of civic wisdom, when in 
the parable the Law is spoken of as a building with many halls and many 
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Protagoras, Meno, Loeb Classical Library (New York:  G.  P.  Putnam’s Sons, 1924). An 
alternative reading for ‘respect and right’ is ‘shame and right’.
29Ibid., 321 D, p.  133.
doorkeepers, each more powerful and more terrible than the next.30 And 
more surely still the Law in question, under which K. is executed, <344> is 
not only no ordinary law. It has no human origin at all but is instead a law 
of a higher order, of a higher order also because it is concerned, as 
Protagoras indicates of Zeus’ law for all humanity, mankind, with a neces-
sary condition for any positive law at all. In Brentano’s terms the Law is 
concerned with the good, is even identical with the good. In the same frame 
of reference, the offense of which K. is accused is ignorance of the good and 
of the highest practical principle. The offense for which he is executed is 
incapacity for any such knowledge and so incapacity for any decision or 
action that would be correct by its nature or intrinsically.
2. Correct choice: Brentano’s ethical theory
The term"moral" an"immoral" apply to the will. Every act of will is 
directed toward some deed which the agent believes to be in her power and 
each has a motive. That each willing has a motive implies that each has 
some end or purpose that is desired for its own sake. All willings are pur-
posings. Without such a genuine, ultimate end there would be no genuine 
motive for the adoption of any means whatever. Means can themselves be 
correct or incorrect. But whether they are correct or not is a matter of 
whether they are or are not genuinely appropriate for the actualization of 
the purposed end. The rightness or wrongness of the action, including the 
rightness or wrongness of any means that may be employed, is dependent 
upon the rightness or wrongness of the purpose. And here Brentano 
acknowledges that there are various possible purposes on which persons 
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may act so that the decision to act involves a choice not just of means but 
of purposes, and even of ultimate purposes as well. The question as to the 
moral correctness of an action therefore concerns primarily the correctness 
of the end chosen.
Where the choice of purposes is concerned, we shall say: choose 
a purpose which can reasonably be considered actually achiev-
able. Yet this answer is not enough; much of what can be 
achieved is rather to be avoided than to be sought: of what is 
achievable choose always the best! That alone is the proper 
answer.31
This is, for Brentano, the one absolute practical commandment, the 
only categorical imperative. Morally right will requires a correct choice of 
ends. But to make a correct choice here requires that we be able to recog-
nize the proposed end as something in <345> itself good or better than its 
alternatives. But how, if at all, do we come by our acquaintance with what 
is good and what is better? To answer these questions we must, according 
to Brentano, discover the origin of the concept"good" an"better," for these, 
like all concepts, must originate from insights, i.e., intuitions, whose objects 
are concrete. The concepts in question must derive from perceptions 
through which there is given the state of affairs that a certain set of objects 
exemplifies those concepts.
a. The empirical origin of the concept"good" an"better": analogous 
derivation of "true."
The concept of "the good" originates in a manner quite analogous to 
that of "the true." Both are derived from internal perceptions, perceptions of 
mental phenomena. The concept "true" originates from the perception of 
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evidently correct judgments, of acts of judging that evidently affirm some-
thing correctly of a subject matter. From such perceptions we get the con-
cept of truth, whose meaning is explicated by the proposition that of two 
contradictory judgments--the one being affirmative, the other negative--
only one can be correct and the other is incorrect. To say of something that 
it is true is to say that to affirm it is correct. Quite analogously, the concept 
"good" originates from the perception of evidently correct emotions. Of two 
contradictory emotions--the one being a loving, the other a hating--only 
one can be correct and the other is incorrect. To say of something that it is 
good is to say that to love it is correct. As we say of something that it is 
false when to deny it is correct, so we say of anything that it is bad if to 
hate it is correct.
b. Evident and blind judgments; evident and blind emotions
 Each type of activity, judgments on the one hand and emotions 
on the other, is carried out blindly in some cases, evidently in others. In the 
case of judgments, there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between those 
which are true and therefore correct but blind, such as judgments made on 
the basis of a blind trust in sense perceptions or in habit and those which 
are made on the basis of evidence. Blind judgments do not provide knowl-
edge in the strictest sense of the word. Not all believing, not even all cor-
rect believing, is knowing. The person who judges in a blind, non-evident 
way cannot know the judgment to be true, i.e., correct, <346> whether it 
be her own or that of another. In order to know the truth of a blind belief it 
is necessary "…that the judgment be known to agree with one which is evi-
dent either immediately or mediately to me myself in object, form, tense 
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and, where relevant, in mode of apodicticity…"32 Brentano is thus led to a 
vaguely Platonic position; in the strict sense of the verb ‘to know’, a person 
cannot be taught to know the truth of any belief. She may be taught blindly 
to believe that it is true. She will not know that it is true unless it agrees 
with a judgment whose truth is already evident to her or with one derivable 
from judgments whose truth is already evident to her. Otherwise she will 
not be able to know the truth of the belief in question until she is able evi-
dently to make a judgment which agrees with it. Ultimately, insight into 
truth is not teachable; Brentano writes, “That without which it would be 
impossible for us to judge about the truth of any assertion is surely the evi-
dence."33
 In a completely analogous way, Brentano speaks of blind emotions in 
contrast to intrinsically correct ones. The latter are the emotional analog of 
evident judgments. As a blind judgment may be true without being per-
ceived to be true so a blind love or hate may be correct without its correct-
ness being perceived, i.e., “evident" in a transferred sense. Some loves and 
hates may be purely instinctual or purely habitual without being evident at 
all. So there may be in persons and in other animals such a thing as an 
instinctual prejudice in favor of pleasure and an instinctual aversion to pain. 
Such blind emotions, even if universal to the species, would not by them-
selves indicate that pleasure is rightly loved or that pain is rightly hated. 
Just as the truth of a judgment can be known only if the judgment is expe-
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und Briefe, ausgewählt, erläutert und eingeleitet von Oskar Kraus (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 
1930), p.  94.  The emphasis is my own.
33Franz Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz.  Erkenntnistheoretische Abhandlungen 
und Briefe, ausgewählt, erläutert und eingeleitet von Oskar Kraus (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 
1930), p.  94.  The emphasis is my own.
rienced, i.e., perceived, to be correct so the correctness of a love and thus 
the goodness of what is loved can be known only if the love is perceived to 
be correct. As our concept of truth is derived from our internal perception of 
the correctness of true judging acts so our concept of good is derived from 
<347> the internal perception of the correctness of emotional acts.
c. Virtue is unteachable: the point of K.’s trial
 Pursuing the analogy, a person cannot know an emotion or an emo-
tional attitude, whether it be her own or another’s, to be correct unless she 
executes the act and does so wit"evidence" of its correctness. In order to 
know the correctness of a blind emotion it would be necessary that the 
emotion be perceived to agree with one which is evident to, i.e., internally 
perceived by, the person himself as correct. Our entire knowledge of the 
good is derived from such perceptions.34 Accordingly, if virtuous conduct is 
to be conceived as conduct informed by a knowledge of good and evil then a 
person cannot be taught to behave virtuously any more than she can be 
taught to know the truth of a judgment. The issue of whether virtue is or is 
not teachable is central to the dialog Protagoras, which we have suggested 
as one of Kafka’s sources for the motives in theory of law that are illustra-
ted in Joseph K.’s trial. Protagoras narrates his version of the Prometheus 
myth in order to show that human  beings all do have some acquaintance 
with the good, that people do in fact believe virtue to be teachable and that 
they do indeed try to teach it. Joseph K.’s is the limiting case proscribed by 
Zeus’ fundamental law for human societies. K. is not accused of having vio-
lated any laws of the government under which he lives. He lives by the 
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rules, following them blindly, lacking any acquaintance with the rightness or 
wrongness of the conduct they prescribe. To know the genuine value or dis-
value of such commandments, he would have to perceive the correctness or 
incorrectness of loving them: he would need to know their goodness or bad-
ness. In fact he is unaware that any such acquaintance with good and bad is 
to be had at all, and in this consists his offense. Lacking any acquaintance 
with good and evil, K. is in no position to decide whether the conventional 
norms he has been following, at least up to the point at which The Trial 
begins, are good or bad.
But despite the affinities which have been mentioned between his 
theory of knowledge and that of Plato, Brentano is an empiricist, at least in 
so far as the origin of concepts is concerned.35 K. might still acquire the 
acquaintance he lacks even though he has as yet not even an obscure and 
confused trace [presentation, idea, Vorstellung] of such acquaintance. K.’s 
trial is the procedure by which the Court is to test whether he is capable of 
acquiring a knowledge of good and evil, i.e., <348> whether he is or is not 
capable of perceiving any emotion at all to be correct or incorrect by its 
nature.
d. Guilt and definite acquittal are logically compatible
 This interpretation of K.’s trial threatens to make some sense 
even of the notion of  "definite acquittal." A defendant might be 
definitely acquitted even though she was guilty at the time of her 
arrest. If K. is accused of having no acquaintance with the Law, i.e., 
with good and evil, then he would cease to be guilty should the lack 
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be made good during the trial itself. That K. is considered guilty from 
the start is indicated at his arrest.36 This is confirmed by the painter, 
Titorelli, who tells K. that the Court can never be dislodged from the 
conviction that the accused are guilty.37 K. can see in this only a con-
tradiction when Titorelli tells him shortly thereafter:
I forgot to ask you first what sort of acquittal you want. There 
are three possibilities, that is, definite acquittal, ostensible 
acquittal, and indefinite postponement. Definite acquittal is, of 
course, the best, but I haven’t the slightest influence on that 
kind of verdict. As far as I know, there is no single person who 
could influence the verdict of definite acquittal. The only decid-
ing factor seems to be the innocence of the accused. Since you 
are innocent, of course, it would be possible for you to ground 
your case on your innocence alone. But then you would require 
neither my help nor help from anyone.38
How can the possibility of definite acquittal be held open if the Court will 
remain forever convinced, that the accused was guilty in the first place? K., 
having no inkling of the charge against him, concludes that he is being told 
in indirect fashion that judges can be persuaded to render a verdict contrary 
to their own convictions. K. is
willing for the time being to accept the painter’s opinions, even 
where they seemed improbable or contradicted other reports he 
had heard. He had no time now to inquire into the <349> truth 
of all the painter said, much less contradict it, the utmost he 
could hope to do was to get the man to help him in some way, 
even should the help prove inconclusive. Accordingly he said: 
“Let us leave definite acquittal out of account then; you men-
tioned two other possibilities."39
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 If K. were accused of having, by some specific past act, violated a positive 
law then no one could consistently pronounce him definitely acquitted while 
remaining convinced that he committed the violation. On the other hand, 
the possibility of definite acquittal might remain open if K. is accused of 
lacking a knowledge of the Law, provided acquaintance with it can be 
acquired.
3. K.’s case on appeal: innocence can be acquired.
If K.’s execution reflects a negative decision of this question by the 
Court, it might then be argued that the verdict is irrational and so incorrect 
and unjust. If knowledge of the good could not be acquired then it would 
make sense to conclude that someone who has none will never have any. 
Brentano’s view however maintains that all such knowledge is acquired. On 
such a view how shall we ever legitimately conclude that a person who has 
none is incapable of acquiring any? In the terms of Kafka’s parable, the door 
leading into the Law stands open always, that is to say at all times so that 
neither the Court nor anyone else may ever close it. 40 Surely, we may never 
conclude then that a person’s access to the Law has been closed to her 
completely. It might be suggested, therefore, that K.’s being "convicted" 
and executed is evidence of the inaptness of the interpretation, which has 
here been outlined, of the nature of K.’s offense and the Law h"violates." 
The suggestion is nonetheless false, The interpretation is defensible 
whether K.’s execution be considered just or unjust, and the defense is 
fruitful and revealing in either case,
If the Court is wrong and K. is unjustly executed, that serves to 
emphasize the absolute cleft between the Court and the Law. That the two 
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be completely separate is in fact a consequence of the present interpreta-
tion. The Law, as has been claimed all along, is no human convention what-
soever. If the Law were capable of being infallibly formulated and communi-
cated or if the novel offered any positive statement whatsoever of the con-
tent of the Law, that would by <350> itself be strong evidence against this 
interpretation. There is not a trace of any such evidence. The Law in ques-
tion is never a matter of authoritative decree. There are numerous charac-
ters, both officials and hangers-on who claim knowledge of the Court and its 
workings; no one claims to be an authority on the Law itself--not even the 
Lawyer, Dr. Huld. If the Law were, as we have maintained, one which could 
be violated even by someone who in her conduct happens to do no harm, 
who may even do considerable good in the sense that her actions have 
extrinsic value as a means to an end which is good in itself but is simply not 
known to be good by the agent, then one wonders how such an offender 
would ever be detected. And there is indeed something very mysterious 
about the process of detection and arrest, something so mysterious that it 
would have to be considered totally arbitrary when judged by normal legal 
standards. That is in fact the judgment K. makes when he is told at his 
arrest by the Warder Willem, “Our officials…never go hunting for crime in 
the populace but, as the Law decrees, are drawn toward the guilty and must 
send out us warders. That is the Law. How could there be a mistake in that 
?"41 The procedures of the Court seem so anomalous that one wonders how 
they should lead to anything at all, much less to a just verdict--the more so 
when one considers the character of the Court officials and of those who 
surround them. As Kafka portrays them, all are somewhat sleazy, dis-
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reputable or petty; most are dishonest as well. The Priest is the only excep-
tion and there is little about him that is positively sympathetic. How could 
anyone trust such an institution? K. does not. But the point is not that his 
mistrust should be displaced by trust in the Court’s authority. Part of K.’s 
error in the conduct of his trial is his belief that his guilt or innocence will 
be decided by the Court. He seeks to influence the verdict through officials’ 
foibles as well as through official channels when neither course would 
establish his innocence. If the Court’s verdict were unjust that would be 
irrelevant so far as the nature of the Law is concerned. The guilt or 
innocence at issue here are absolutes, not established by any human and 
fallible procedure. <351>
The relation between the Court and the Law is itself enigmatic. Courts 
which administer positive laws are themselves established by positive law. 
Their procedures are mandated by and may be defined by positive law. Pos-
itively decreed penal institutions are concerned with enforcing positive laws. 
Zeus’ decree, however, is concerned with a condition for the possibility of 
positive laws and socio-political institutions. It mandates the execution of 
those who cannot partake of respect and right but does not stipulate who 
shall determine guilt or execute the sentence. In Kafka’s novel only the 
mysterious procedure of arresting the guilty is ever said to be mandated by 
the Law itself. Willem’s assertions about the arrest procedures are in fact 
the only statements purporting at least partially to express the content of 
the Law itself. And it is worth noting that these do not imply any knowledge 
of K.’s guilt on the part of the Court officials. It is said only that the officials 
are drawn by guilt. If the Law were concerned wit"the good" and if K. were 
"an evil"--as Brentano conceived these terms--then court officials could 
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"detect" K.’s guilt through a correct emotive act regardless of whether they 
do or do not perceive and know the act to be correct.
On this hypothesis, then, the character of the Court’s officials, 
whether they be nice persons or not, whether they do or do not know the 
Law themselves, whether the Court’s procedures be rational or irrational--all 
this is irrelevant to K.’s guilt or innocence, The Law is concerned with 
absolute values, absolute standards of good and evil. If guilty, K.’s guilt 
consists in his not knowing of any such values and standards. So long as a 
person guilty in this sense remains guilty she cannot see that the guilty 
ought to be condemned no matter what verdict the Court arrives at.
4. K.’s delusion over guilt: the legend, “Before the Law."
K.’s tendency to believe that his innocence or guilt depends entirely 
upon the verdict delivered by the Court develops into a conviction after he 
concludes that, “Above all, if he were to achieve any thing at all, it was 
essential that he should banish from his mind once and for all the idea of 
possible guilt. There was no such guilt."42 The belief that guilt is decided by 
authoritative decree is the delusion against which K. is <352> warned by 
the Priest when he relates the legend "Before the Law." The Priest like "one 
who sees another fall and is startled out of <her> senses" has just shrieked 
at K., “Can’t you see one pace before you?" Having been told, “Your guilt is 
supposed, for the present, at least, to have been proved," K. had responded 
that he would get more help and was told, “You cast about too much for 
outside help…especially from women. Don’t you see that it isn’t the right 
kind of help?" K.’s reply was that there are some women with whose help 
-27-
  
_________________________________________
42Ibid., p.  158f.
he would inevitably win in the end, “Especially before this Court, which con-
sists almost entirely of petticoat-hunters." As the verger extinguished the 
candles on the high altar of the otherwise almost totally darkened 
cathedral, K. in order to mollify the Priest proceeds to disarm his behavior 
and the statements he has just made of their implications concerning the 
nature of the Court: “Are you angry with me…It may be that you don’t know 
the nature of the Court you are serving…These are only my personal experi-
ences…I wasn’t trying to insult you."43
It now occurs to K. that he
 “...could obtain decisive and acceptable counsel from [the 
Priest] which might, for instance, point the way, not toward 
some influential manipulation of the case, but toward a circum-
vention of it, a breaking away from it altogether, a mode of 
living completely outside the jurisdiction of the court. This pos-
sibility must exist, K. had of late given much thought to it." 44
By now, K. has forgotten about the Law altogether and thinks only of the 
Court and how it is to be either manipulated or circumvented. The Priest 
then relates the legend in order to remind K. of the Law and to exhibit the 
delusion under which K. is suffering.
“You are very good to me, said K. .…“But you are an exception 
among those who belong to the Court. I have more trust in you 
than in any of the others, though I know many of them. With 
you I can speak openly." “Don’t be deluded," said the Priest. 
“How am I being deluded?" asked K. “You are deluding yourself 
about the Court," said the Priest. “In the writings which preface 
the Law that particular delusion is described thus: before the 
Law stands a doorkeeper…"45 
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Neither this passage nor any other states explicitly in what the delusion 
consists. The two most obvious possibilities are that K. is deluded either (1) 
in his feeling that he can trust the Priest more than others belonging to the 
Court, or (2) in his distrust of the others. In fact, however, neither of these 
states the delusion precisely. <353> Rather, K. is deluded in his belief that 
what is at issue is the verdict of the Court and how he may influence it in 
his favor or avoid it altogether. He thinks that judgments of others are to be 
accepted on trust concerning a matter in which no one else may be correctly 
trusted. Their judgments could not be accepted correctly unless K. himself 
is either able to form the same judgments with evidence of their correctness 
or analytically to derive them from judgments whose correctness is evident 
to him. The matter in question is one which could be decided only by K.’s 
own judgment, and this judgment would have to be an evident one, a judg-
ment based on a perception of his own loves and hates with respect to their 
intrinsic correctness or incorrectness. In the absence of such a perception 
on which the judgment might be based, K.’s case is lost.
K.’s initial reaction to the parable is to interpret it as referring to the 
first of the two possibilities mentioned above as the most obvious.
“So the doorkeeper deceived the man," said K. immediately, 
strongly attracted by the story. “Don’t be too hasty," said the 
Priest, “don’t take over an extraneous opinion [die fremde 
Meinung] without testing it. I have told you the story in the very 
words of the scriptures. There’s no mention of deception in it." 
“But it’s clear enough," said K., “and your first interpretation of 
it was quite right. The doorkeeper gave the message of salva-
tion to the man only when it could no longer help him." 46
Now the Priest has as yet offered no interpretation at all (except that the 
story describes some delusion); he has warned K. to base his interpretation 
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on the scriptures themselves, and he has pointed out that they mention no 
deception. Nonetheless, K. takes the parable to mean that he would be 
deluded if he were to trust anyone belonging to the Court since all officers 
of the Court deceive the Accused, and he attributes this interpretation to 
the Priest. Thus K. decides initially in favor of the first of the two more 
obvious interpretations of the "delusion." But this interpretation, in as much 
as it implies that persons belonging to the Court deceive the accused, 
makes nonsense of itself. It undermines the very evidence on which it is 
based, the testimony of the Priest; it presents a paradox of self-reference 
like the paradox involved in the statement by Epimenides the Cretan to the 
effect that Cretans are liars. It can not therefore consistently be construed 
either as true or as false.
 The bewildering discussion which follows between the Priest and K. 
leaves the latter still arguing, quite cogently, that the man from the country 
is deceived. He is deceived whether the doorkeeper intended the deception 
or not. K. accepts the interpretation according to which the doorkeeper is 
either ignorant of the Law, simple minded, or a deceiver. <354> Through 
one or the other of these characteristics, in the doorkeeper, the man from 
the country gets deceived. This being so, the doorkeeper is unfit for his 
office. In this interpretation, K. is really taking over elements from the vari-
ous commentaries the Priest has mentioned. And, in doing so, he is again 
ignoring the evidence, the words of the scriptures. What the letter of the 
story shows is that the doorkeeper is mistaken in his belief that he will be 
able to shut the door. He is mistaken unless the scriptures themselves are 
mistaken. But the "statement" that the scriptures are mistaken would also 
make nonsense of itself since it too would lead inevitably to the Liar Para-
dox.
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Back at the beginning of the parable it is written that "…the door leading 
into the Law stands open as always [offensteht wie immer]…"47 The story 
establishes that the doorkeeper is mistaken when he says that he is about 
to shut the door. No other errors are established. What the story shows is 
that the doorkeeper is fallible. It does not show that he is simpleminded or 
that he is a deceiver or even that he is ignorant of the Law. The fallibility of 
the doorkeeper would suffice to establish that his word is not to be taken as 
identical with the Law. If merely being fallible is enough to render his 
utterances untrustworthy then, indeed, as one set of commentators whom 
the Priest mentions aver, “…the story confers no right on anyone to pass 
judgment on the doorkeeper." If human persons are all subject to error then 
his fallibility does not distinguish the doorkeeper from the rest of humanity. 
His error would be culpable only if doorkeepers have--as K. seems to think 
they have--a special duty, peculiar to their office, to avoid this particular 
error. But such a duty is nowhere mentioned in that "scriptures." The 
doorkeeper is, although fallible, hardly less worthy of trust than anyone 
else.
 The second of the two more obvious interpretations of the delusion 
illustrated by the legend was <355> that K. is mistaken in his distrust of 
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everyone belonging to the Court except for the Priest. As an objection to 
K.’s claim that the doorkeeper is unfit for his office, the Priest cites an 
extreme form of this interpretation when he says that
Many aver that the story confers no right on anyone to pass 
judgment on the doorkeeper. Whatever he may seem to us he is 
yet a servant of the Law; that is, he belongs to the Law and so 
is beyond human judgment. In that case one must not believe 
that the doorkeeper is subordinate to the man. Bound as he is 
by his service, even only at the door of the Law, he is 
incomparably greater than anyone at large in the world. The 
man is only seeking the Law, the doorkeeper is already attached 
to it. It is the Law that has placed him at his post; to doubt his 
dignity is to doubt the law itself." “I don’t agree with that point 
of view," said K. , shaking his head, “for if one accepts it, one 
must accept as true everything the doorkeeper says. But you 
yourself have sufficiently proved how impossible it is to do 
that." “No," said the Priest, “it is not necessary to accept every-
thing as true, one must only accept it as necessary." “A melan-
choly conclusion," said K. “It turns lying into a universal princi-
ple."48
So, if one accepts the point of view that to doubt the doorkeeper’s dignity, 
his authority, is to doubt the Law itself then one must also acknowledge 
that whatever he says is necessary, whether true or not. For this point of 
view, the utterances of fallible persons, in so far as they belong to the Law, 
must nevertheless be regarded as necessary though they need not be 
regarded as true.
Less extreme grounds--such as those developed in the preceding par-
agraph--for holding that Court officials need not be thoroughly and con-
sistently distrusted are not discussed because K. terminates the discussion 
at this point. The next question which would have been in order is therefore 
one which K. never asks. If the utterances of persons belonging to the 
Court--and so ostensibly to the Law--are not bound to be regarded as true 
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in spite of their being necessitated, is there some sort of obligation to 
believe these utterances even though the persons making them are clearly 
fallible? An affirmative answer would mean that all of the doorkeeper’s and 
the Court’s judgments must be regarded as true on the basis of faith alone. 
Because of their ostensible relation to the Law, the statements of Court 
officers would have to be accepted as being somehow for the best in all 
cases even if one is not able correctly, i.e., with evidence, to judge that this 
is so and even in a case where one was able with evidence to judge that it 
is not so. The doorkeeper and the Court would have to be regarded as the 
ultimate authority in matters concerning the Law. <356> This is the delu-
sion which the legend illustrates, and K. is in fact behaving inconsistently in 
rejecting this point of view when the Priest spells it out for him. For the 
view and the delusion are K.’s own.
The text itself tells us that K. breaks off of the discussion prema-
turely:
“A melancholy conclusion," said K. “It turns lying into a universal 
principle."
K. said that with finality, but it was not his final judgment. He 
was too tired to survey all the conclusions arising from the story, and 
the trains of thought into which it was leading him were unfamiliar, 
dealing with impalpabilities [unwirkliche Dinge] better suited to a 
theme for discussion among Court officials than for him. The simple 
story had lost its clear outline, he wanted to put it out of his mind… 49
K. could not have continued the discussion for long without exposing the 
actual delusion under which he acts and with it the inconsistency involved 
in his having just now rejected the very principle on which he is now acting. 
For K. himself takes the view that matters concerning the Law are to be left 
to the authorities; the Law is not his province. Although his returning to the 
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bank is not as urgent as he pretends and he could very well stay longer, 
when the Priest asks, “Do you want to leave already?" he replies, “of 
course, I must go, I’m the Chief Clerk of a Bank...“50 Chief Clerks of Banks 
have no business discussing the Law and other abstract or non-actual 
entities [unwirkliche Dinge]; that is the province of the experts, the Court 
officials, who are skilled at it. Yet, according to Plato’s Protagoras at least, 
cities cannot be if only a few have a share of these as of the other arts. 51
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